Falange Espanola

Falange Espanola


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I oktober 1933 etablerede José Antonio Primo de Rivera Falange Española (spansk Falange). I sit manifest, der blev offentliggjort senere samme år, fordømte Falange socialisme, marxisme, republikanisme og kapitalisme og foreslog, at Spanien skulle blive en fascistisk stat, der lignede den, der blev oprettet af Benito Mussolini i Italien.

Ved folketingsvalget, der fandt sted i februar 1936, vandt Falange kun 0,7 procent af stemmerne. Efter Folkefrontens sejr voksede Falange Española hurtigt og havde i juli et medlemskab på 40.000.

Primo de Rivera støttede fuldt ud det militære oprør i juli 1936 mod den republikanske regering, og efter udbruddet af den spanske borgerkrig blev Falange den dominerende politiske bevægelse af nationalisterne.

José Antonio Primo de Rivera blev taget til fange af republikanerne den 6. juli 1936. Han blev holdt i fangenskab, indtil han blev henrettet i Alicante den 20. november 1936. Dette efterlod bevægelsen uden en stærk leder og i april 1937 havde general Francisco Franco lidt svært ved at forene Falange med Carlisterne og andre små højrepartier for at danne Falange Española Tradicionalista.

I oktober 1933 grundlagde Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, tredje Marques de Estella og diktatorens ældste søn, den spanske Falange og fangede fantasien hos store dele af arbejderklasserne og Spaniens unge ved at tilbyde dem idealer, der ikke havde plads i et regime blottet for glæde eller iver. Til en statsmandslig vision og en dyb kærlighed til sit land, der var arvet fra hans berømte far, tilføjede Jose Antonio et poetisk begreb om nationale anliggender. Han talte om en uigenkaldelig tro på et forenet folks skæbner, om politiske partiers meningsløshed og om endeløse stridigheder mellem dem, om behovet for at erstatte liberale slagord med en dyb respekt for menneskets frihed. Han bad om en fælles tro på livets grundlæggende mål og fordømte dem, der gav løfter og ikke opfyldte dem. Han krævede respekt for de religiøse principper, der udgør grundstenen i den spanske historie, og opfordrede medlemmer af den nye generation til at genoplive deres følsomhed for virksomheder af universel karakter som dem, der havde inspireret nationens fortid. "Udsigten til vold vil ikke skræmme os, hvis dialektik undlader at opretholde retssagen."

Nation, enhed, imperium

1. Vi tror på den højeste virkelighed i Spanien. Alle spaniernes presserende kollektive opgave er at styrke, hæve og forstørre nationen. Alle individuelle, gruppe- eller klasseinteresser skal uden tvivl underordnes udførelsen af ​​denne opgave.

2. Spanien er en udelelig skæbne i universelle termer. Enhver sammensværgelse mod denne udelelige helhed er frastødende. Al separatisme er en forbrydelse, vi ikke må tilgive. Den herskende forfatning, for så vidt som den tilskynder til opløsning, krænker den udelelige karakter af Spaniens skæbne. Vi kræver derfor øjeblikkelig ophævelse.

3. Vi er forpligtet til Empire. Vi erklærer, at Spaniens historiske opfyldelse er imperiet. Vi kræver for Spanien en fremtrædende position i Europa. Vi tolererer ikke international isolation eller udenlandsk indblanding. Hvad angår landene i det spanske Amerika, er vores mål at forene kultur, økonomiske interesser og magt. Spanien hævder, at dets rolle som den åndelige akse i den spansktalende verden giver ret til en fremtrædende position i verdensanliggender.

4. Vores væbnede styrker - på land, til søs og i luften - skal være tilstrækkeligt stærke og effektive til hele tiden at sikre Spanien total uafhængighed og en verdensstatus, der passer nationen. Vi vil give land-, hav- og luftstyrkerne tilbage al den offentlige værdighed, de fortjener, og vi skal sørge for, at et lignende kampsyn spænder over hele det spanske liv.

5. Spanien vil igen se til søvejene for sin herlighed og sin rigdom. Spanien vil sigte mod at blive en stor søfarende magt i faretider og af hensyn til handelen. Vi kræver for fædrelandet lige status blandt flåder og på flyruter.

Stat, individ, frihed

6. Vores vil være en totalitær stat i tjeneste for fædrelandets integritet. Alle spaniere vil spille en rolle deri gennem deres medlemskab i familier, kommuner og fagforeninger. Ingen må spille en rolle deri gennem et politisk parti. Systemet med politiske partier vil resolut blive afskaffet sammen med alle dets konsekvenser: uorganisk stemmeret, repræsentation af modstridende fraktioner og Cortes, som vi kender det.

7. Menneskelig værdighed, individets integritet og individuelle frihed er evige og immaterielle værdier. Men den eneste måde at være virkelig fri på er at være en del af en stærk og fri nation. Ingen vil have lov til at bruge sin frihed mod

enhed, styrken og friheden i fædrelandet. En streng disciplin vil forhindre ethvert forsøg på at forgifte eller splitte det spanske folk eller tilskynde dem til at gå imod fædrelandets skæbne.

8. Den nationalsyndikalistiske stat vil tillade ethvert privat initiativ, der er foreneligt med den kollektive interesse, og vil faktisk beskytte og stimulere dem, der er gavnlige.

Økonomi, arbejde, klassekamp

9. På det økonomiske område betragter vi Spanien som et kæmpe syndikat for alle, der beskæftiger sig med produktion. For at tjene

national økonomisk integritet skal vi organisere det spanske samfund langs korporative linjer ved at oprette et system med vertikale fagforeninger, der skal repræsentere de forskellige produktionsgrene.

10. Vi afviser det kapitalistiske system, der ser bort fra folks behov, dehumaniserer privat ejendom og omdanner arbejderne til formløse masser, der er tilbøjelige til elendighed og fortvivlelse. Vores åndelige og nationale bevidsthed afviser ligeledes marxismen. Vi vil kanalisere arbejdsklassernes drivkraft, der i dag føres vild af marxismen, ved at kræve deres direkte deltagelse i nationalstatens formidable opgave.

11. Den nationalsyndikalistiske stat vil ikke stå grusomt adskilt fra økonomiske konflikter mellem mænd, og den vil heller ikke se ufrivilligt på, da den stærkeste klasse underlægger de svageste. Vores regime vil gøre klassekamp helt umulig, da alle, der samarbejder om produktionen, vil udgøre et organisk hele deri. Vi beklager og skal for enhver pris forhindre misbrug af delvise interesser samt anarki i arbejdsstyrken.

12. Formålet med rigdom er at forbedre levestandarden for alle mennesker - og dette vil være vores stats erklærede politik. Det er utåleligt, at store masser af mennesker lever i fattigdom, mens nogle få nyder enhver luksus.

13. Staten vil anerkende privat ejendom som et legitimt middel til at nå individuelle, familie og sociale formål og vil beskytte den mod at blive misbrugt af høje finanser, spekulanter og pengeudlånere.

14. Vi forsvarer skridtet mod nationalisering af bankvirksomhed og virksomheders overtagelse af de større offentlige tjenester.

15. Alle spanske borgere har ret til at arbejde. De offentlige institutioner vil sørge for passende vedligeholdelse for dem, der ufrivilligt er arbejdsløse. Mens vi bevæger os mod den nye overordnede struktur, bevarer og øger vi alle de fordele, arbejderne får ved den nuværende social lovgivning.

16. Enhver spanier, der ikke er ugyldig, har pligt til at arbejde. Den nationalsyndikalistiske stat vil ikke have det mindste hensyn til dem, der ikke opfylder nogen funktion, men som forventer at leve som gæster på bekostning af andres indsats.

Jord

17. Vi skal hurtigst muligt hæve levestandarden i landdistrikterne, som Spanien altid vil være afhængig af for sin mad. Af denne grund forpligter vi os til en streng gennemførelse af en økonomisk og social reform af landbruget.

18. Som led i vores økonomiske reform styrker vi landbrugsproduktionen ved hjælp af følgende foranstaltninger:

Ved at garantere alle landmænd en passende minimumspris for deres produkter.

Ved at sørge for, at meget af det, der i dag absorberes af byerne som betaling for deres intellektuelle og kommercielle tjenester, returneres til landet for at give landdistrikter tilstrækkeligt.

Ved at organisere et reelt system med national landbrugskredit, der vil låne landmænd penge til lave renter og derved garantere deres ejendele og høst og frigøre dem fra åger og protektion.

Ved at sprede uddannelse vedrørende landbrug og husdyrbrug.

Ved at rationalisere produktionen i henhold til jordens egnethed og de afsætningsmuligheder, der er tilgængelige for dens produkter.

Ved at fremme en protektionistisk toldpolitik, der dækker landbrug og opdræt af kvæg.

Ved at fremskynde konstruktionen af ​​et hydraulisk netværk.

Ved at rationalisere jordbesiddelser for at fjerne både store godser, der ikke udnyttes fuldt ud, og småboliger, der er uøkonomiske på grund af deres lave udbytte.

19. Vi skal opnå en social organisation af landbruget ved hjælp af følgende foranstaltninger:

Ved at omfordele endnu en gang jordbruget til at fremme familiebedrifter og ved at give landmændene al opmuntring til at melde sig ind i fagforeningen.

Ved at redde fra deres nuværende fattigdom masserne af mennesker, der er ved at udmatte sig selv på at kradse på ufrugtbar jord og ved at overføre dem til nye bedrifter i agerjord.

20. Vi vil iværksætte en utrættelig kampagne med genplantning og opdræt af skove, der pålægger alvorlige sanktioner over for alle, der forhindrer det, og endda midlertidigt at gribe til håndhævet mobilisering af alle spanske unge til den historiske opgave at genopbygge vores lands rigdom.

21. Staten vil have beføjelser til uden konfiskation at konfiskere jord, hvis ejendomsret er erhvervet eller nydt ulovligt.

22. Den nationalsyndikalistiske stats prioritet vil være at returnere deres fælles ejendom til landsbyerne.

National, uddannelse, religion

23. Det er en grundlæggende mission for staten at pålægge uddannelse en streng disciplin, der vil frembringe en stærk, forenet, national ånd og fylde de kommende generationers sjæle med glæde og stolthed over deres fædreland. Alle mænd vil modtage foreløbig træning for at forberede dem på æren af ​​optagelse i Spaniens nationale styrker.

24. Kultur vil blive organiseret på en sådan måde, at intet talent går tabt på grund af mangel på finansiering. Alle dem, der fortjener, vil have let adgang selv til videregående uddannelser.

25. Vores bevægelse integrerer den katolske ånd, som traditionelt har været herlig og dominerende i Spanien, i genopbygningen af ​​nationen. Kirke og stat vil nå til enighed om områderne for deres respektive magter, men enhver indblanding fra Kirken eller enhver aktivitet, der kan undergrave statens værdighed eller nationens integritet, vil ikke blive tolereret.

Den blå skjorte, med den romerske salutstil med armen fuldt udstrakt, er det universelle symbol, som Falange har bidraget til den nationale og kejserlige opstandelse i Spanien.

Falange skjorte er et universelt symbol. Ligesom togaen var på kejsernes tid. Ligesom den militante klostervane var i middelalderen. Ligesom kjolen skulle være senere under oplysningstiden. Og kjolen på Liberalismens tid. Og ligesom overalls er blandt de marxistiske socialister.

Skjorten er kommet til at repræsentere den nye katolske universalitet, som Falange forsvarer. Det er ikke en undertøj, men derimod en ydre kjole. I stedet for at være en skammelig beklædningsgenstand er det et kostume, en hel beklædningsgenstand, en totalitær beklædningsgenstand. Bekræftende og aggressiv.

I dag differentieres verdens folk ikke kun i måden, de åbner og lukker næverne på, men også på, om de har en skjorte eller ej, om de skjuler den eller viser den frem.

Og trøjen er vendt tilbage - med Historie - som et frontlinjet, kategorisk symbol, netop på det tidspunkt, hvor de mennesker, der kun har brug for denne elementære beklædningsgenstand for at leve og styre, har genoplivet igen i verden. Solens og den blå himmel mod folkene i regn og sne.

Hyrdernes og landmændenes folk mod maskiner og materialisme. Rom mod London og Spanien mod Moskva.


Spanien først: Falangens tilbagevenden

Efter 1975 blev resterne af Francos Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista spredt ud over Spanien og fandt minimal støtte og trods forsøg på at konsolidere magten i de første år af demokratiet. Mange politiske partier stræbte efter at hævde Falange som deres egne i løbet af de næste fyrre år - de fleste forsvandt simpelthen. I 1976 rekonstituerede et politisk parti sammensat af nogle af de mest radikale medlemmer af den gamle Falange sig som et nyt politisk parti, Falange Española de las JONS.

Den nye Falange Española de las JONS tog afstand fra Franco og forsøgte i stedet at kæde sin historie til José Antonio Primo de Rivera, grundlæggeren af ​​det oprindelige spanske fascistiske parti, Falange Española. Siden 1939 var José Antonios arv blevet omhyggeligt bevogtet af hans søster, Pilar Primo de Rivera, der sikrede, at hans biografi blev inkluderet i børns lærebøger, og også genudgav sin brors værker gennem Sección Feminina, kvindeafdelingen i Falange. I 1997 stødte Falange Española de las JONS på en krise, da mange af dens medlemmer brød ud i et andet radikalt højreorienteret parti, simpelthen kaldet 'La Falange'.

I begyndelsen af ​​2018, der blev forstærket af genopståelsen af ​​en radikal højre i form af Vox, skabte tidligere marginaliserede og underopdelte falangistiske og radikale højrepartier en alliance eller identitær front. Det lånte fra retorikken fra USA's præsident Donald Trump og ideologien og æstetismen fra andre 'identitære' grupper i Europa for at oprette deres egen koalition 'Identidad Española'. Bestående af fire højreorienterede partier, Falange Española de las JONS, La Falange, Democracia Nacional og Alternativa Española, kaldet sig selv 'ADÑ.' ADÑ eller "ENNTE TILDO ESPAÑA, oversættes som 'Spain First' - sandsynligvis inspireret af Donald Trumps "America First" -platform, der demonstrerer nytten af ​​Trumpian retorik for fascistiske pariteter. I stedet for eksplicit anti-immigrant retorik, ligesom Trump, beder ADÑ om 'effektivt at kontrollere vores grænser'.

Med knap 2.000 Facebook -følgere forsøger ADÑ en minimalistisk æstetik og anvender sloganet 'Somos como somos. Somos como tú. Pensamos como tú! ’[Vi er, hvordan vi er. Vi er ligesom dig. Vi tænker som dig!]. I korte videoer og på lokale møder bruger ADÑ ofte spansk klassisk guitar til at fremkalde en slags "typisk spansk" stemning.

“GENKENDELSE AF KRISTEN TRADITIONEN SOM GRUNDLAG FOR VÆRDIER OG EUROPÆISK KULTUR

Over for de ideologier, der søger at omkonfigurere vores samfund i henhold til en ny antropologi, må Spanien bekræfte sine traditionelle værdier. Værdier af værdighed og frihed, der udgør arven fra Europa, der fortjener at blive reddet. En moralsk oprustning er nødvendig for at få os til at være fortroppen til forsvar for livet og den naturlige familie.

Europa kan ikke indeholde stater, der er baseret på kulturer, der er fremmede for den kristne civilisation, og som bringer vores kultur og model for sameksistens i fare. ”

ADÑ har haft møder i Cartagena (Murcia), Almería, Madrid og Valladolid. En kvinde, Magdalena, ofte sammen med en mandlig pendant, åbner sammenkomster ved hjælp af en taktik, der skal appellere til fællestræk mellem spaniere. Sætninger inkluderer: 'Jeg kan godt lide at gå i byen' 'Jeg handler om min familie' 'Jeg er ærlig' 'Jeg er en del af kirken' 'Jeg er meget stolt over at være en del af Spanien' 'Jeg er alt om paella '' Og hvem er ikke? 'De fortsætter:' Vi er til forsvar for livet. Vi har værdier. Vi er glade, lidenskabelige ’. Dette efterfølges derefter af mere eksplicit nationalistiske taler fra partiledere.

I Almeria brød Magdalena fra sin standardåbning, men forsøgte stadig at bringe publikum sammen, denne gang mod venstre: 'Demokratisk tolerance! De kalder os fascister, men jeg kalder dem feje! Fegere! De tør ikke lade os tale. De tør ikke lytte først, og derefter stille spørgsmål eller kritisere, hvad de synes er nødvendigt ’.

I dette øjeblik benægter Magdalena ikke betegnelsen ’fascistisk’, men demonstrerer i stedet frustration fra venstrefløjens afslag på at debattere flygtninges, farvedes og queer menneskers grundlæggende menneskerettigheder.

Både ADÑ og Vox positionerer sig selv til at drage fordel af sociale medier, æstetik fra det 21. århundrede, Eurosceptisme, mistillid til den midterlige højre Partido Popular og stigende folkelig frygt for et skifte i demografien for at bringe deres radikale højre diskurs ind i det offentlige rum. Selvfølgelig er dette en taktik, der ses i hele Europa - ekko af taktik, der var banebrydende for lignende 'Britain First' i Storbritannien.

Mere relevant demonstreres denne fremvisning af transnationalisme imidlertid i præsidenten for Democracia Nacional, en af ​​de bestanddele af ADÑ, der også tjener i bestyrelsen for den transeuropæiske 'Alliance for Peace and Freedom', en radikal højre-alliance, der modtog finansiering fra Europa -Parlamentet i både 2016 og 2017. Selv om disse radikale højre politiske partier stiller sig selv i modsætning til EU, er de mere end villige til at bruge de systemer, de er imod, for at drage økonomisk fordel. Mere bekymrende giver disse mere mainstream -finansierede projekter AND mulighed for at finde tilbage til mainstream.

Dr Louie Dean Valencia-García er seniorstipendiat ved CARR og assisterende professor i digital historie ved Texas State University. Hans profil kan findes her.

© Louie Dean Valencia-García. Synspunkter udtrykt på dette websted er individuelle bidragydere og afspejler ikke nødvendigvis synspunkter fra Center for Analyse af den Radikale Højre (CARR). Vi er glade for at dele materialer, der tidligere ikke er offentliggjort, med fællesskabet under Creative Commons-licens 4.0 (Attribution-NoDerivatives).


Oprindeligt var Falange Española, vedtog organisationen navnet Falange Española de las J.O.N.S., eller Spansk Falange af Assemblies of the National Syndicalist Offensive, efter sin fusion i 1934 med Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista eller Fagforeninger i den nationalsyndikalistiske offensiv. I 1937 blev organisationen kendt som Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista efter en yderligere fusion med Carlist Traditional Communion. Falange var det eneste juridiske parti i Spanien, efter at Francisco Franco fortrængte den sovjetjusterede folkefrontsregering i den spanske borgerkrig.

Regimet i Francisco Franco, der overgik 2. verdenskrig, anses normalt ikke for at have været fascistisk eller have ændret sig til et ikke-fascistisk regime.

Efter 1975, da Spanien forvandlede sig til et liberalt demokrati, mistede Falange magten. Derudover splittede dette Falange, hvor flere grupper hævdede det falangistiske navn.


Falangisme

Falangisme (Falangismo på spansk) var og er stadig en politisk ideologi for Falange Española de las JONS og derefter Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista. Falangisme betragtes som en fascistisk eller nationalistisk ideologi. Ώ ] Under den fascistiske hersker, Francisco Franco, blev mange radikale elementer i Falangisme, der anses for at være fascistiske, fortyndet, og det blev en enorm autoritær og konservativ ideologi, der tilhørte det francoistiske Spanien. ΐ ] Modstandere af Francos ændringer i partiet omfatter den tidligere Falange -leder Manuel Hedilla. Falangisme lægger stor vægt på katolsk religiøs identitet, selvom den har haft nogle sekulære synspunkter om kirkens direkte indflydelse i samfundet, da den mente, at staten skulle have den øverste myndighed over nationen. Α ] Falangisme understregede behovet for autoritet, hierarki og orden i samfundet. Α ] Falangisme er antikapitalistisk, antidemokratisk og antiliberal. Β ]

Falanges originale manifest, "De seksogtyve punkter", erklærede Falangisme for at støtte: Spaniens enhed og afskaffelse af regional separatisme, etablering af et diktatur ledet af Falange, der udnytter vold til at regenerere Spanien, fremmede genoplivning og udvikling af den spanske Empire en social revolution at skabe: en national syndikalistisk økonomi, der skaber nationale syndikater af både ansatte og arbejdsgivere til gensidigt at organisere og kontrollere den økonomiske aktivitet, landbrugsreform, industriel ekspansion, respekt for privat ejendom med undtagelse af nationalisering af kreditfaciliteter for at forhindre kapitalistisk åger . Γ ] Det understøtter kriminalisering af strejker fra medarbejdere og lockout af arbejdsgivere som ulovlige handlinger. Δ ] Falangisme støtter staten til at have jurisdiktion til at fastsætte løn. Δ ] Under Franco opgav Falange sine oprindelige antikapitalistiske tendenser og erklærede ideologien for fuldt ud forenelig med kapitalismen. Ε ] Imidlertid støttede Franco-æraens Falange udviklingen af ​​ikke-kapitalistiske kooperativer som Mondragon Corporation, fordi det forstærkede den francoistiske påstand om ikke-eksisterende socialklasser i Spanien under hans styre. Ζ ]

Den spanske Falange og dets partnere i spanske stater over hele verden fremmede en form for panhispanisme kendt som Hispanidad der fremmede både kulturel og økonomisk forening af spanske samfund rundt om i verden. Η ]

Falangisme har angrebet både det politiske venstre og højre som sine "fjender" og erklæret sig hverken for venstre eller højre, men en synkretisk tredje position. ⎖ ] Men videnskabelige kilder, der gennemgår falangisme, placerer det på den politiske højre side. ⎗ ]


Hablar de la Falange es nombrar a España

Indlejre

Integrer URL

Integrer billede

Mand i uniform stående med et Falange -flag i den ene hånd og et spansk flag i den anden

Mens de fleste plakater i denne udstilling er fra republikansk Spanien, er denne plakat fra nationalistisk Spanien. Det dominerende tema i denne plakat er naturligvis enhed. En Falangesoldat står mellem to flag. Flaget til venstre, med de traditionelle røde og gule striber, repræsenterer nationalistisk og monarkistisk Spanien. Den til højre, med de revolutionære farver sort og rød, repræsenterer det republikanske Spanien og dets forskellige revolutionære grupper. Flagene rører næsten hinanden bag soldaten i en stærk repræsentation af Falangens magt til at bringe enhed til Spanien. Alligevel er der ingen illusioner i dette billede. Det er betydningsfuldt, at en soldat holder de to flag, idet det tjener som anerkendelse af, at militærmagt synes at være den eneste måde at få et forenet Spanien til.
Falange var en ekstrem nationalistisk bevægelse dannet i Madrid i oktober 1933 af José Antonio Primo de Rivera. Kort efter dets dannelse fusionerede Falange med Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalist (JONS) og udvidede sit navn til Falange Española de las JONS. I 1934 lagde den nye Falange hovedprincipperne op i et syvogtyve-punkts program, der understregede spansk enhed, stærk regering, et indarbejdet statsligt nationalt syndisk system, nationalisering af banker og kredit, militær styrke, traditionalisme og kejserlig ekspansion. I modsætning til de socialistiske eller marxistiske revolutioner erklærede Falange sin støtte til den "nationale revolution" og identificerede sig indledningsvis som en fascistisk bevægelse. Da udtrykket fascisme i stigende grad blev forbundet med udenlandske bevægelser, tog Falange afstand fra etiketten for at fremme sin nationalistiske dagsorden.
Da Folkefronten, en politisk koalition af socialister, kommunister og republikanere, vandt valget i februar 1936, havde Falange kun 10.000 medlemmer. Organisationen ville vokse betydeligt under krigen. I øjeblikket for de første oprør fra Franco og andre generaler i hele Spanien lovede Falange -ledere deres støtte til de nationalistiske oprørere. Mellem 1937-1939 tjente over 250.000 frivillige i Falange militære enheder, hvor mange tjente i Falange civile enheder i bagvagten. I april 1937 overtog Franco kontrollen over organisationen, fusionerede den med Carlisterne og omdøbte den til Falange Española Traditionalista (FET) eller FET de las JONS (som anført på plakaten). Følgelig blev FET forhøjet til status som officiel statspart.
Det er klart, at FET de las JONS fremstillede denne plakat som det fremgår af åget og pilene - et fælles symbol på organisationen. Kunstneren er ukendt.

1 tryk (plakat): litografi, 3 kol. 70 x 60 cm

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Spaniens "semifascisme"

José Antonio Primo de Rivera, 1934.

Fondo Marín, Pascual Marín/Wikimedia Commons

Uddrag fra En fascistisk historie, 1914-1945 af Stanley G. Payne. Udgivet af University of Wisconsin Press.

Denne artikel supplerer fascisme, a Skiferakademi. Besøg for at lære mere og tilmelde dig Skifer.com/Fascisme.

Fascistisk politik blev indført i Spanien i flere faser, alle uden held, før borgerkrigen brød ud i 1936. Den indledende forkæmper for den fascistiske idé var den avantgarde æstet Ernesto Giménez Caballero ("den spanske D'Annunzio"), der offentliggjorde offentligt sin fascisme i 1929 og blev snart næsten fuldstændig udstødt af det overvejende liberale spanske kulturelle etablissement og blev det, han selv kaldte "en litterær Robinson Crusoe." Giménez Caballeros fascisme stammer direkte fra Rom. (Hans kone var italiensk.)

Giménez Caballero var imidlertid ikke en politisk organisator, og den første fascistiske politiske gruppering i Spanien blev oprettet af Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, en underbeskæftiget universitetsuddannet, der havde specialiseret sig i matematik og filosofi. Her var inspirationen igen primært italiensk, hans lille band blev kaldt Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (ret svarende til Fasci Italiani di Combattimento) og dets ugentlige udgivelse La Conquista del Estado ("Statens erobring"). Selvom Ledesma hentede sin inspiration fra Italien (og også delvist fra Tyskland: Han påvirkede midlertidigt en Hitler -frisure), og JONS's officielle program, der sigter mod en "national syndikalistisk stat", kan læses som en carbon kopi af ideerne og mål for den italienske fascisme, foretrak Ledesma ikke at bruge etiketten og indså, at den var kontraproduktiv i den generelt venstre-liberale spanske atmosfære. 1

JONS forblev totalt isoleret på den lille sektniveau, hovedsagelig afhængig af universitets- og sekundære studerende. I løbet af sine to og et halvt års uafhængig eksistens (1931–34) havde JONS ikke den mindste indflydelse på spanske anliggender.

Et mere kraftfuldt, bedre finansieret forsøg på en spansk fascisme blev udarbejdet af højrefløjssektorer i 1933. 2 Hitlers sejr stimulerede interessen for Spanien, ikke så meget blandt potentielle fascister-af hvem der tilsyneladende var få på halvøen- men blandt højre radikaler eller potentielle højre radikaler, som var markant flere. Baskiske finansfolk gik på indkøb i løbet af sommeren 1933 efter lederen af ​​en potentiel kontrarevolutionær, demagogisk spansk fascisme. Selvom de gav en dråbe støtte til Ledesma og JONS, blev sidstnævnte anset for at være for radikale og for uvæsentlige til at fortjene større støtte.

Hovedlederen for en kommende spansk fascisme, der kom frem i sommeren og efteråret 1933, var José Antonio Primo de Rivera, ældste søn af den afdøde diktator, general Miguel Primo de Rivera, der regerede fra 1923 til 1930. Han udviklede sig først fra konservativ autoritær monarkisme til et mere radikalt mærke af nationalistisk autoritarisme. I 1933 var den yngre Primo de Rivera-snart almindeligvis kendt som José Antonio-blevet interesseret i noget som fascisme (italiensk stil) som et redskab til at give form og ideologisk indhold til det nationale autoritære regime så usikkert og uden held forsøgt af sin far. I modsætning til Ledesma var José Antonio ikke modvillig til at bruge etiketten fascist, selvom den nye bevægelse, han grundlagde med en gruppe kolleger i oktober 1933, til sidst blev kaldt af den mere originale titel Falange Española ("spansk phalanx").

Falange begyndte med meget mere økonomisk støtte fra store virksomheder, der var tilbøjelige til den radikale højre end JONS, hvilket fik JONS til at fusionere med den i begyndelsen af ​​1934. (Den resulterende organisation blev kaldt Falange Española de las JONS.) I løbet af de næste to år , og faktisk helt ned til begyndelsen af ​​borgerkrigen, kendetegnede Falange sig primært ved sin ubetydelighed. Ligesom den rumænske jernvagt støttede den i første omgang på sit studenterklientel, men i modsætning til den rumænske bevægelse formåede den ikke at generere nogen bredere støtte fra mellem- eller middelklassen.

Denne periode i ørkenen gav imidlertid bevægelsens ledere lidt tid til at reflektere over, hvad de handlede om. Efter et år begyndte José Antonio Primo de Rivera at bevæge sig "til venstre", da falangisternes nationale syndikalisme fik mere socialt radikale overtoner. Der var en noget forsinket reaktion på faren for mimesis, og inden udgangen af ​​1934 benægtede de fleste falangister, at de var fascister. I 1935 blev kritikken af ​​italiensk korporatisme som for konservativ og kapitalistisk - en kritik ganske almindelig blandt de mere radikale typer af fascister og nazister i udlandet - gengivet af nogle falangistiske ledere, herunder Primo de Rivera.

Det hele var noget forvirrende for italienske fascister. I den "universelle fascisme" -fase i midten af ​​1930'erne besluttede de italienske taksonomer noget ufatteligt, at falangister faktisk var fascister på grund af deres tro på "autoritet, hierarki, orden" og deres anti-materialistiske falangistiske "mystik". 3 José Antonio anerkendte på sin side, at alle de "nationalistiske fornyelsesbevægelser", der modsatte sig marxisme, liberalisme og den gamle konservatisme, havde nogle ting til fælles, men også udviste markante nationale forskelle. Da den spanske højrefløj ophørte med at støtte en mere radikal fascisme, regnede Falange med det udenlandske lønningsliste for det italienske regime i cirka ni måneder i 1935–36. 4

At falangisme udviste visse egne karakteristika er ubestrideligt, men disse forhindrede ikke den i at dele næsten alle de generelle kvaliteter og egenskaber, der ville sammensætte en oversigt over generisk fascisme. Som hypernationalister afslørede alle fascistiske grupper pr. Definition visse forskellige nationale træk. I den spanske sag adskilte falangisme sig noget fra italiensk fascisme i sin grundlæggende katolske religiøse (hvis politisk antikleriske) identitet, for dette var centralt for falangisme og kun marginal for fascismen. Falangisternes koncept om det "nye menneske" inkorporerede således næsten alle kvaliteterne hos den traditionelle katolske helt, mens de fusionerede dem med komponenter fra det 20. århundrede.

José Antonio Primo de Rivera remained a highly ambivalent figure, perhaps the most ambiguous of all European national fascist leaders. Major personal characteristics—such as a fastidious aestheticism combined with a genuine if sometimes contradictory sense of moral scruple, a cultivated intellectual sense of distance and irony, and, for a Spanish politician, a remarkably limited spirit of sectarianism and group rivalry—may have disqualified him for successful leadership. There is abundant testimony that he considered abandoning the project at several points but could not escape the commitment imposed by the deaths and sacrifices of other members of the movement.

Of all national fascist leaders, he was probably the most repelled by the brutality and violence associated with the fascist enterprise. He stopped using the term fascist before the end of 1934 and the term totalitarian before the end of 1935. He would occasionally refer to rightist conspirators as “fascist wind­bags.” Yet however diffident and differential his approach may have been, he never renounced the fascist goals in politics. In the post-fascist era his admirers have made much of José Antonio’s “humanism,” his opposition to total dictatorship, his stress on the individual personality and “man as the bearer of eternal values,” and his Catholicism. 5 Yet in the José Antonian formulation these do not necessarily contradict fascism fairly similar formulations might be found by some nominally leading members of Italy’s PNF.

Large sectors of the Spanish right were becoming “fascistized,” as Ledesma aptly put it, in one or more superficial senses, but the erstwhile fascist movement itself was worse than anemic. Anti-fascism had been strong among the left from 1932 on, but it was precisely the leftists who registered, as Ledesma commented ironically, the only truly “fascist” activity in Spain in violence and direct action. In its first phases, Falangism seemed so fastidious, rhetorical, and averse to direct action that rightist critics labeled it “franciscanism“ rather than fascism. After Ledesma broke with Primo de Rivera and the Falange, the question mark that he placed in the title of his memoir Fascismo en España? seemed fully appropriate. In the final elections of 1936 the Falange registered only forty-four thousand votes in all Spain, about 0.7 percent of all ballots cast, revealing fascism as weaker in Spain than in any other large continental European country.

The profound debility of fascism, so long as the regular Spanish political system existed had several causes. The absence of any strong sense of Spanish nationalism deprived fascism of that key rallying point. In Spain mobilized nationalism was inverted: It was expressed through the intense “peripheral nationalism” of Catalans and Basques, directed against the unified Spanish nation-state. Another key factor was the limited secularization of rural and provincial society in much of Spain, particularly in the north. There, the most obvious and attractive cross-class alternative to liberal or leftist politics was political Catholicism. Moreover, the nominal electoral success of the conservative Catholic political party CEDA (the Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right-Wing Groups) from 1933 down to early 1936 gave this tactic the appearance of victory. Fascism enjoyed much less cultural reinforcement in Spain than in central Europe, for the cultural and intellectual revolution of the 1890s had achieved less resonance in the peninsula. There was a rightist Catholic culture of considerable force, but not a secular-vitalist-Darwinist cultural environment of any vigor. As far as political revolutionism was concerned, the left seemed able to enforce a monopoly of its several brands it enjoyed greater political success and support in Spain than in any other country in the world during the 1930s. There remained less of an outlet for fascism as the consummation of a frustrated, deviant revolution there than in central Europe.

Civil war produced a polarized revolutionary-counterrevolutionary conflict in which leadership passed completely into the hands of the insurgent Nationalist military who created the Francisco Franco regime in 1939. Growth of Falangist membership to several hundred thousand during the first year of the civil war was not in itself decisive, for death in battle and execution had decapitated the movement, while military dictatorship in the Nationalist zone totally subordinated it.

Core Falangists, the camisas viejas (literally “old shirts”), played only a small role in the new state and held only a small minority of positions in the new system. They did not even control all of the administration of the new state party, the Falange Española Tradicionalista. Addition of the last adjective, reflecting the nominal fusion with the Carlists (traditionalists who wanted to install a monarchy), underscored the major right-wing limitations to the fascism of the new regime. That early Franquism contained a major component of fascism is undeniable, but it was so restricted within a right-wing, praetorian, Catholic, and semipluralist structure that the category of “semifascist” would probably be more accurate. 6

And yet, the same adjective might be applied not inaccurately to Mussolini’s Italy, and the similarities between that regime and early Franquism are greater than is sometimes thought. Foreign policy and international context marked the sharpest points of divergence, for the ultimate structure of the Franco regime was largely dependent on world affairs. Whereas Mussolini tried to play a major independent role from 1933 on, Franco had no illusions that he need not wait on events. Had Hitler won the war, there seems little doubt that Franquism would have become less conservative and rightist and more radical and overtly fascist in form. But both regimes used subordinated state fascist parties that were merged with and subsequently incorporated unindoctrinated nonfascist elements. Both permitted limited pluralism in national society and institutions under executive dictatorship. In neither case was the institutionalization of the regime developed primarily by revolutionary fascist ideologues, but more commonly by monarchist theoreticians of the radical right, together with fascistic moderates. In both cases the challenge of militant fascist national syndicalism was soon faced and thoroughly subordinated.

Fra A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 by Stanley G. Payne. Reprinted by permission of the University of Wisconsin Press. Copyright 1996 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. Alle rettigheder forbeholdes.

1. As the organizational—and to a large degree ideological—founder of Spanish fascism, Ledesma has been the subject of two full-length biographies, both entitled Ramiro Ledesma Ramos. The first, by Tomás Borrás (Madrid, 1972), is descriptive, superficial, and hagiographic. The second, by José M. Sánchez Diana (Madrid, 1975), has somewhat greater analytic depth.

2. For taxonomic purposes, it might be pointed out that a tiny right radical Spanish Nationalist Party had been organized by a physician named Albiñana in 1930. Albiñana early adopted more than a few of the trappings of fascism, stressing imperial expansion on the one hand and a broad, economically reformist state syndicalism on the other. He organized his own minuscule “Legion” for street battle and at one point apparently hoped to develop a mass movement. After 1933, he dropped his most fascistic overtones in favor of a more orthodox and conservative right radicalism. The only pertinent study is in M. Pastor, Los orígenes del fascismo en España (Madrid, 1975), 38–61.

3. M.A. Ledeen, Universal Fascism (New York, 1972), 100, 110–11.

4. J. F. Coverdale, Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (Princeton, 1975), 50–64.

5. The most systematic study of the Falangist leader’s political thought is N. Meuser, “Nation, Staat und Politik bei José Antonio Primo de Rivera,” Ph.D. diss., University of Mainz, 1993. In Spanish, see A. Muñoz Alonso, Un pensador para un pueblo (Madrid, 1969). Cf. C. de Miguel Medina, La personalidad religiosa de José Antonio (Madrid, 1975).

6. Mihaly Vajda concluded that the F ranco regime could not be considered fascist “since it did not come to power as a mass movement applying pseudo-revolutionary tactics but as an open adversary of revolutionary power, a counter-revolution.” Vajda, Fascism as a Mass Movement (London, 1976), 14.


José Antonio and the Spanish Falange

THE FALANGE Española was preceded by several similarly oriented organizations which favored a corporate state, nationalism, and respect for tradition and social justice, while vigorously opposing parliamentarianism, class struggle and the money power. One such group, the Partido Nacionalista Español, was founded in 1930 by a neurologist named José María Albiñana and patterned after the French Camelots du Roi. (ILLUSTRATION: José Antonio Primo de Rivera)

Violently nationalist and authoritarian, it introduced the Roman salute into Spanish politics. In 1932 it was reorganized as the Spanish equivalent of the movements of Hitler and Mussolini, but it supported the monarchy and religion. Repeated arrests of Albiñana kept his party in the small-fry category.

The most important pre-Falange Fascist organization was put together by Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, a young, unkempt, opinionated postal clerk and philosophy student who in the spring of 1931, just before the end of the monarchy, started a political weekly La Conquista del Estado. Although Ramos and his band received help from the monarchist propaganda fund of Admiral Aznar’s government, the journalistic venture lasted only seven months. In this short time, however, the paper established the essential features of Spanish National Syndicalism and exerted a strong influence over a growing number of intellectuals who were dissatisfied, as Stanley G. Payne has written in Falange (1961, p. 12), with “both the atomistic individualism of liberal systems and the fatalistic impersonality of Marxism.”

Meanwhile, another young crusader, Onésimo Redondo Ortega, who came from a family of peasants and priests, was organizing workers in his native Castille. His experience as a lecturer in Mannheim, Germany, had acquainted him with National Socialist thought, which he attempted to reconcile with his own intense Catholicism. Youthful, vigorous, handsome and passionate, Redondo was obsessed with three goals: national unity, the primacy of traditional Spanish values and social justice. In June 1931, he founded the weekly Libertad.

A few months later, Ledesma and Redondo agreed to combine their efforts and launched the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (JONS), the first Spanish National Syndicalist organization. What JONS lacked in coherent ideology, it made up for in enthusiasm and spirit. While the Jonsistas chose the yoked arrows of the Catholic kings to symbolize their goal of a restored Spanish empire, Ledesma coined the slogan Arriba! The group also adapted the red-black-red anarchist banner to signify its radical aims. All of these trademarks of National Syndicalism would later be adopted by the Falange, and even today they are still recognized as official symbols of the Spanish state.

Ledesma and Redondo worked poorly together, so JONS made only limited progress in its first two years of independent existence. The two leaders had little understanding of practical or tactical questions and failed signally to make their ideology attractive to the general public.

The General’s Son

The birth of the Spanish Republic in 1931 brought disarray to the nationalist Right. The middle class wanted neither to accept the new political realities nor to return to the past. The Confederation of Autonomous Rightist Groups (CEDA) was organized around the conservative Catholic Action and led by the uninspiring José María Gil Robles who could not rouse the dissident students, bourgeois and workers to recognize him as an alternative to the lackluster conservatism of the traditionalists and the antinational and antitraditional forces of the Left.

It was at this crucial moment that José Antonio Primo de Rivera made his dramatic entrance into politics as a man of the Right. Born in 1903 in Andalusia of an upper-middle-class family with a long tradition of military service, José Antonio differed sharply from his father, General Miguel Primo de Rivera, who ruled Spain from 1923 to 1930. Whereas the latter had been a sensual, jovial Babbitt, José Antonio was modest, serious and given to intellectual pursuits. Educated in literature, modern languages and the law, he was, among many other things, an amateur poet, especially fond of Kipling.

José Antonio was an excellent student at the University of Madrid, where he dabbled in student politics. Despite his background, he favored the liberal faction, but was careful not to become too involved in too much political activity during his father’s rule. Emotionally, though not politically, attached to the General’s career, he could not help being dismayed when his father’s supporters forced his resignation after he no longer served their interests. As time went on, he found himself agreeing with his father’s scorn of politicians, the liberal intelligentsia, parliamentarianism and middle-class democracy.

In 1928 and 1929 José Antonio developed a serious interest in politics and began studying Spengler, Keyserling, Marx, Lenin, Ortega y Gasset and the Spanish traditionalists. By the early 1930s his rejection of the abstract vapidity of class-ridden liberalism with its accent on internationalism and equalitarianism was as vehement as his reaffirmation of the old European values of nation, culture and personality.

Because of his close bond to his family, José Antonio was incapable of objectively evaluating his father’s seven-year rule. This, and his hatred for liberalism, led him to take an active role in politics as Vice-Secretary General of the newly formed Unión Monárquica. Several months later he announced as a candidate for the Cortes solely to “defend the sacred memory of my father.”

His showing was good in liberal Madrid, but not good enough. After the election he returned to private life, concentrating on his private law practice. He was often discouraged, and thought about emigrating to America. He spent much of his free time thinking about social and political questions, searching for an alternative to traditional conservatism and old-guard liberalism. He was particularly antagonistic to the political bosses and landlords of the provinces, to the privileges of the wealthy and to the Spanish Right, which tolerated these social injustices.

The Fascist

José Antonio first publicly revealed his Fascist leanings in an article for a new weekly El Fascio, which the government confiscated before it appeared. This act of suppression reinforced his new political stance. He would dedicate the few remaining years of his short life to an Hispanicized National Socialism.

Although aware of his talents, José Antonio thought that his intellectualism and his relationship to Primo de Rivera prevented him from becoming the Caudillo of Spanish Fascism. He knew that he was not a “man of the people” and declared that he “had too many intellectual preoccupations to be a leader of masses.” Yet he felt he must do what he could.

During the spring of 1933 José Antonio began to build contacts with like-minded men, including the famous aviator Julio Ruiz de Alda, an ardent nationalist who distrusted the established parties. They quickly became close comrades. Together they distributed a considerable number of leaflets in Madrid and began to win converts to what José Antonio wanted to call the Movimiento Español Sindical. But Ruiz de Alda printed “FE” on the leaflets, which could stand for either Fascismo Español or Falange Española.

On October 29, 1933, José Antonio launched the Falange Española at a political rally held at the Teatro Comedia in Madrid. Two thousand sympathizers, including Ramiro Ledesma, were present and many more heard the meeting on the radio. Three speeches were given, the high point being José Antonio’s heavily rhetorical and tensely poetic address, in which he denounced the “economic slavery” of the liberal state, the “materialistic” and “class struggle” dogma of socialism, and spoke for the “irrevocable unity of destiny” of the Spanish Patria, for “the deeper liberty of man,” and for “a system of authority, of hierarchy and of order.” Above all, he called for a “poetic movement” of struggle and sacrifice.

Although the founding of the Falange Española was largely ignored by the establishment press, over a thousand members signed up in the first month. The Falange quickly overshadowed JONS as det Spanish movement of National Syndicalism. José Antonio won a seat in the Cortes, where he appeared only rarely. His impressive oratory, personal charm and handsome appearance were vital to winning the financial support and popular respect essential to the success of a political movement.

On February 11, 1934, the leaders of JONS met and agreed to merge with the Falange, although still condemning what was termed “its reactionary features.” From then on, the Falange would be known as the Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva National-Sindicalista — for short, “FE de las JONS.” The JONS’ slogans and emblems were adopted, and a troika of José Antonio, Ramiro Ledesma and Julio Ruiz de Alda took over the direction of the unified movement. Ledesma was gambling that the “social revolutionary” emphasis of JONS would triumph over the “reactionary-monarchist” elements within the Falange. He was more right than wrong. “Falange ideology henceforth took its esthetic tone from José Antonio and much of its practical content from Ramiro Ledesma” (Payne, p. 48).

Enemy Reprisals

To celebrate the new unity, a rally was held on March 14, 1934, in Valladolid. More than three thousand raised their right arms as Falange leaders entered the hall. José Antonio again gave the main speech, stressing the differences that distinguished the Falange from other parties of both the Right and Left. As the meeting ended, a brawl broke out with some pistol-packing assailants outside. Although one Falange student died, the rally was declared a success. Actually, the fight provided a kind of baptism of fire for the newly unified movement.

In late 1933, the Falangist weekly FE (Falange Española) appeared. Socialists put intense pressure on vendors to prevent sales, and fights were frequent, some resulting in death. Despite increasing violence, José Antonio ordered the Falange not to retaliate. Although he had stated that just ends justify violent means, he was against drawing the sword of political terrorism. Eventually, however, growing resentment against the movement’s passivity forced José Antonio to countenance violent reprisals, even though he never personally involved himself in such acts.

Oppression by the Rightist government, and terror on the streets by the Left, dampened the Falange’s initial burst of growth. Party headquarters were regularly invaded by the police, FE vendors were eventually banned from the streets of Madrid, and Falangists were often arrested.

In June 1934, José Antonio was called up for impeachment in the Cortes for unlawfully possessing firearms. Since most political leaders were either armed or had a bodyguard, the impeachment motion was nothing more than an effort by the Center-Right factions to silence him. He was saved by the help of a moderate socialist leader, who personally liked José Antonio and detested the underhanded methods being used to unseat him.

In line with its program of “social justice” the Falange set up a workers’ organization, the Confederación de Obreros Nacional-Sindicalistas (CONS), in August 1934. A previous JONS association of Madrid taxi drivers became the first CONS syndicate. These syndicates began with only a few dozen members each, a rather limited membership compared to the massive trade union organizations like the powerful UGT and CNT, which exerted irresistible pressure on the Falangist workers. Unable to effect any significant benefits for its own members, CONS groups failed to have any impact on the tightly organized Spanish working class.

Ridden by factions and under blistering attack from both the Left and the Right, the future of the Falange looked bleak in the summer of 1934. Nonetheless José Antonio’s personal power and popularity within the movement grew. The students idolized him. His physical courage, personal charm, vigor and eloquence made him the Caudillo despite his official position as only one triumvir among equals. Eventually his supporters started pushing for a jefatura unica, which would confirm him as party leader. In October 1934, the National Council of the Falange voted by the narrowest of margins, seventeen to sixteen, to establish an authoritarian structure with José Antonio as Jefe Nacional.

In November the Falange issued a program of twenty-seven points written by Ledesma and modified and polished by José Antonio. This systematized statement of National Syndicalist principles was not really anything new, but the twenty-fifth point, dealing with the Church, kicked up a furor. It declared that while the Falange was faithfully Catholic, it would not allow the Church to interfere in its secular affairs. More than a few Falangists quit and went over to the Monarchist youth organization.

Meanwhile Ledesma tried to persuade José Antonio to make an effort to win Leftist, working class and military support in preparation for an unspecified coup d’état. Knowing that the 5,000-member Falange was much too weak to become committed to such a foolhardy project, José Antonio stuck by his strategy of slow, organized, peaceful growth. Unconvinced, Ledesma sought to gather what support he could within the Falange to rebuild a “revolutionary” National Syndicalist movement. But the other leaders refused to go along and reaffirmed their loyalty to the Jefe. The Falange was now entirely José Antonio’s.

The Falange

Falange membership was divided into two parts: the “first line” active members the “second line” passive collaborators. The most active component of the “first line” were in the Falangist Militia, a paramilitary group. At the beginning of 1935 the “first line” numbered no more than 5,000 and was concentrated largely in Madrid, Valladolid and Seville. By February 1936, “first line” membership had grown to 10,000, while the total number of Falangists was approximately 25,000, quite a gain over previous years but a mere drop in the bucket considering the size of rival Spanish political groups.

A 1934 law preventing students from belonging to political parties kept large numbers of young men from joining the Falange. Most university students were organized in a Catholic association, with a socialist-liberal group next in size. Although a Falangist college organization never attracted more than a minority of students, they were the hardest-working and most determined of all Falangists. José Antonio’s principal stronghold of support was the University of Madrid, where he often gave speeches.

Falange members were strikingly young, sixty to seventy percent of them under twenty-one. “They were a gay, sportive group, high-spirited, idealistic, little given to study, drunk on José Antonio’s rhetoric, and thirsting for direct action. Their only goal was an everlasting nationalist dynamism” (Payne, p. 83).

The dynamism was supercharged with an impressive array of symbolism. Falangists wore blue shirts and sang the anthem “Cara al Sol.” They greeted each other with the Fascist salute, thundered their slogans at political get-togethers and painted Arriba España og España, Una, Grande y Libre on any wall they could find.

The 1936 Election

As the elections of 1936 approached, the Falange faced a major dilemma: Should the movement cooperate with Rightist parties in a united National Front to oppose the Popular Front of the Left? José Antonio persuaded the National Council to agree to a united effort, but negotiations with Rightist groups showed that the Falange would be hurt more than helped by such cooperation. The Falange decided to go it alone.

Falange candidates ran in nineteen districts, with José Antonio standing for election in Madrid and in six other regions. The party stressed land reform, the promotion of local industry and full employment. The election returns were disastrous. Not a single Falangist candidate won. In Madrid the Falange percentage of the vote was 1.19. In Cadiz, José Antonio received less than 7,000 votes. Nevertheless, in the two months following the election, the membership of the Falange probably doubled.

As partisan violence increased, political, social and economic order in Spain disintegrated. On March 1, 1936, José Antonio ordered all university members to enlist in the Falange Militia. A few weeks later, activists organized an assassination attempt against an eminent socialist professor of law. The liberal government used this incident to outlaw the Falange on March 14. All leaders who could be found in Madrid were arrested, including José Antonio.

“The[se] events of February and March, 1936, brought about the death of José-Antonio’s short-lived party, but they marked the beginning of a new process, bathed in blood and steeped in frustration, which was to make an enlarged, reorganized Falange into Spain’s partido del Estado” (Payne, p. 102).

The success of the Popular Front in the February elections and the subsequent disorder in Spain signaled the organization of a military conspiracy by General Emilio Mola. Secret negotiations with the imprisoned José Antonio were begun in May. The prisoner, managing to reestablish the Falange chain of command through a system of messengers, ordered preparations for a violent move against the government. A new underground Falangist newspaper No Importa hurriedly replaced the banned Arriba. As some areas in Spain verged on social chaos, Spanish Nationalists began a definite swing toward Fascism. A private poll conducted in May by the clerical daily newspaper Ya showed José Antonio the readers’ first choice for president of the Republic.

The government kept José Antonio in jail by inventing new charges against him and resorting to other forms of legal chicanery. On June 5, 1936, he was removed to the provincial jail at Alicante, while further arrests of Falangists made the party’s position desperate. When the chain of command again broke down, three-man cells were established to prevent further disorganization. José Antonio gave orders for the Falange to cooperate with the military in the event of a putsch or, if necessary, to prepare for an independent coup of its own.

The outbreak of the Civil War on July 17 thrust an enormous responsibility on the Falange, since it was virtually the only Nationalist group capable of offering a dynamic alternative to the Monarchists and Traditionalists. “Membership increased enormously and soon passed all manageable proportions. As the first wave of emotion swept the Right, everyone hastened to put on blue shirts” (Payne, p. 121).

The war and the influx of undisciplined members made control within the Falange extremely difficult, despite its reemergence from the underground in territories under the control of Franco. Manuel Hedilla, former provincial chief in Santander, acted as the surrogate for the imprisoned José Antonio.

Pressure from the Left to bring the jailed Falangist leader to trial increased. In November he was hauled before a “people’s court” on charges of helping to foment the revolt against the Republic. He defended himself by pointing to his own anti-Rightist activities. Although the evidence against him was circumstantial and his final statement very moving, the sentence was a foregone conclusion. Shortly after dawn on November 20, 1936, José Antonio faced a firing squad.

The death of its revered young leader was a serious blow to the Falange. The weakness of Manuel Hedilla, his successor, the hostility of the military and the general confusion of the times combined to severely weaken Falange independence and identity.

On April 19, 1937, the Carlist and Falange parties were merged by order of Franco into the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista. The awkward new title reflected the confusion of purpose and principles of what was now to be more “movement” than “doctrine.” The Generalissimo named himself Jefe Nacional.

From then on, despite resistance by more principled and more “authentic” Falangists, the combined FET would be the one official political organization of Franco Spain. In using the Falange as an instrument of personal power, Franco betrayed the ideas, the goals and the legacy of José Antonio. Even though it served as a façade for the new Spanish state, falangismo as a living, breathing political force was dead.

As if to make amends for what he had done, Franco established the cult of José Antonio. November 20 was declared a day of national mourning. Plaques commemorating him were set up in all Spanish churches. Schools and military units bore his name and the press and radio continued to refer to El Ausente (The Absent One). At the Civil War’s end a torchlight procession ceremoniously carried José Antonio’s remains three hundred miles to a grand and solemn burial at the resting place of Spain’s kings at El Escorial.

Perhaps the clearest expressions of José Antonio’s world view was contained in his speech of October 29, 1933, on the foundation of the Falange:

The Patria is a total unity, in which all individuals and classes are integrated. It cannot be in the hands of the strongest class or of the best organized party. The Patria is a transcendent synthesis, an indivisible synthesis, with its own goals to fulfill — and we want this movement of today, and the state which it creates, to be an efficient, authoritarian instrument at the service of an indisputable unity, of that permanent unity, of that irrevocable unity that is the Patria.

Here is what is required by our total sense of the Patria and the state which is to serve it:

That all the people of Spain, however diverse they may be, feel in harmony with an irrevocable unity of destiny.

That the political parties disappear. No one was ever born a member of a political party. . . . We were all born members of a family we are all neighbors in a municipality we all labor in the exercise of a profession.

We want less liberal word-mongering and more respect for the deeper liberty of man. For one only respects the liberty of a man when he is esteemed, as we esteem him, as the bearer of eternal values . . . as the corporal substance of a soul capable of being damned and of being saved. . . .

We want Spain resolutely to recover the universal sense of her own culture and history.

And we want one last thing. If in some cases this can only be achieved by violence, let us not balk at violence.

But our movement will not be understood at all if it is believed to be only a manner of thinking [and not] a manner of being. . . . We must adopt [an] attitude [that] is the spirit of sacrifice and service, the ascetic and military sense of life.

I believe the banner is raised. Now we are going to defend it gaily, poetically.

In his article in the first edition of the newspaper FE (December 1933) José Antonio expanded on his political philosophy:

The Spanish Falange firmly believes in Spain. Spain is not a territory, nor an aggregate of men and women. Spain is an entity, real in itself, which has performed world missions, and will have others still to perform.

Hence Spain exists, first, as something distinct from each of the individuals, classes and groups that compose her. Secondly, as something higher than each of those individuals, classes and groups, or even than all of them put together.

Accordingly Spain, which exists as a distinct and higher reality, is bound to have ends of her own. These ends are: continued existence in unity, resurgence of internal vitality and a preeminent share in the spiritual tasks of the world. . . .

A genuine state, such as the Falange wants, will not be based on the sham of the political parties, nor on the Parliament which they engender. It will be founded on the authentic realities of life: the family, the municipality, and the guild or syndicate.

The ideology of José Antonio was partly rooted in the antiliberal, antidemocratic intellectual tradition that found widespread support in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. He and his party members paid homage to Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, Ángel Ganivet and Pío Baroja as “Precursors.” But despite similarities in style and principles, and even initial support from Unamuno, these Spanish intellectuals withheld their support from José Antonio.

The concept of Spain as “a unit of destiny in the universal” was taken from Ortega. Pío Baroja, Spain’s foremost living novelist, had expressed antidemocratic, nationalist views, and Unamuno received José Antonio at his home. But a large part of the Falange leader’s social philosophy was not taken from Spanish sources at all. Rather, it grew out of the views of Nietzsche, Lenin, Spengler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and Hitler.

“In October 1933, [José Antonio] paid Mussolini a visit, and returned to declare that Fascism was ‘a total, universal, interpretation of life’” (Richard A. H. Robinson, The Origin of Franco Spain, s. 98). A year later, however, in response to rumors that he would attend an International Fascist Congress in Switzerland, José Antonio repudiated his ties to Italian and other “imported” ideology by declaring that he had “flatly turned down the invitation in order to make clear the genuinely national character of the movement, which has no intention of giving the appearance of possessing an international leadership. Moreover, the Falange Española de las JONS is not a Fascist movement” (Charles F. Delzell, Mediterranean Fascism, 1970, p. 263).

José Antonio often stressed far-reaching economic reforms. The Falange would nationalize banking and credit, guarantee employment, redistribute land and make higher education free. At the same time, private property was to be respected. By the “corporate state” and “syndicalism” José Antonio meant the organization of “Spanish society corporatively through a system of vertical syndicates for the various fields of production, all working toward national economic unity” (Payne, p. 79). In sum, he wanted broad state economic planning and guidance of national production, but not state ownership of the means of production.

Although Monarchists at one time tried to use the Falange for their own ends, the two never got together. After he became a Falangist José Antonio turned his back on all Monarchist organizations: “April 14 [the end of the Monarchy] is a historical fact that must be accepted. We feel no nostalgia for dead institutions. . . . ”

The Falange was not seen by José Antonio as a political party in the ordinary sense. Rejecting the very concept of political parties, he called for revolution and declared his group belonged neither to the Right, Left nor Center. In fact, the widespread use of symbols, emblems, rituals and oaths made the Falange more akin to a religious order than to a political party. Its leader liked to call it a “militia,” a “union of eager fraternal cooperation and love” and a “holy brother hood.”

The outbreak of the Civil War moved José Antonio, nine months before his death, to give a broader significance to the role of the Falange:

We are witnessing a struggle between the Christian, Western, Spanish, individualistic concept of life, with all that it implies in the field of service and self-sacrifice, and an irreligious, materialistic Russian concept. If the latter should triumph in Spain, large tracts of our country — Catalonia, the Basque Provinces, Galicia — would break away and submit to the Soviet. We are now in the inept hands of sick men, who out of pure resentment might be capable of handing us over to dissolution and chaos. The Spanish Falange summons all — students, intellectuals, workmen, army officers — to the happy and dangerous task of recapturing our lost heritage.

The phenomenon of José Antonio and the Falange was not unique to Spain. It was part of the European response to the failure both of traditional and capitalist conservatism and of parliamentary, laissez-faire democratic liberalism.

Salvador Dali with portrait of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera

European Fascism was the successor to the nationalistic concept of la Patrie born in the French Revolution. It also succeeded the liberal eighteenth- and nineteenth-century concepts of social integration. The dynamics of economic development (rise of large corporations and organized labor) and of political development (rise of the modern state) helped force thinking in terms of the community.

World War I was a strong factor in bringing an end in Europe to the “rationalist” concept of irreversible “progress.” The 1920s and 1930s saw the breakdown in the spiritual power of organized religion. At the same time, there grew up a new mythos, either around the Patria, Fatherland and Nation or, in the case of the Marxists, around the Proletariat. Fascism represented the synthesis of the most dynamic movements of recent European history — Nationalism and Socialism.

To put Spanish Falangism in a proper perspective, we must remember that Fascism in the 1920s and 1930s had become the state ideology of Italy, Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Poland, the Baltic states, Austria and Spain. In its early stages World War II spread Fascism even more widely. But then in 1945 came the triumph of Anglo-American Democracy and Soviet Communism. In Spain a watered-down version of Fascism continued into the 1970s, but the realization of José Antonio’s political and social goals was made impossible by the European holocaust.

In post-Civil War Spain it was not the movement which directed the state, as José Antonio had intended, but the state which directed the movement. Franco’s Falange became a sterile appendage to the state bureaucracy.

The memory of José Antonio, however, has not been totally eradicated from the Spanish mind. On one level, it is demonstrated in a state-sponsored cult designed to give poetic, intellectual and ideological attractiveness to an essentially traditionalist and uninspiring regime. On another level, there exists in Spain today tens of thousands of Spaniards, most of them quite young, who honor the great days of the Falange and work for a post-Franco Spain based on Falangist principles. They have formed into two groups: the Fuerza Nueva and the Círculo Español de Amigos de Europa (CEDADE).

The recent chaos in Portugal has strengthened the conviction of Spanish Fascists that the only long-term alternative to a Communist Iberia is a form of National Socialism. But whereas in the 1930s nations like Germany and Italy could give aid to the Falangists, today the successors of José Antonio have only their own strength to rely on — that and the intellectual and spiritual legacy of their Founding Father.

Kilde: Instauration magazine, December 1976 (transcribed by Counter-Currents)


Spanish Civil War

With the eruption of the Civil War in July 1936, the Falange fought on the Nationalist side against the Spanish Second Republic. Expanding rapidly from several thousand to several hundred thousand [ 11 ] , the Falange's male membership was accompanied by a female auxiliary, the Sección Femenina. Led by José Antonio's sister Pilar, this latter subsidiary organization claimed more than a half million members by the end of the war and provided nursing and support services for the Nationalist forces. [ 12 ]

The command of the party rested upon Manuel Hedilla, as many of the first generation leaders were dead or incarcerated by the Republicans. Among them was Primo de Rivera, who was a Government prisoner. As a result, he was referred to among the leadership as el Ausente, (the Absent One). After being sentenced to death on November 18, 1936, Primo de Rivera was executed on November 20, 1936 (a date since known as 20-N in Spain), in a Republican prison, giving him martyr status among the Falangists. This conviction and sentence was possible because he had lost his Parliamentary immunity, after his party did not have enough votes during the last elections.

After Franco seized power on 19 April 1937, he united under his command the Falange with the Carlist Comunión Tradicionalista, forming Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS (FET y de las JONS), whose official ideology was the Falangists' 27 puntos -- reduced, after the unification, to 26. Despite this, the party was in fact a wide-ranging nationalist coalition, closely controlled by Franco. Parts of the original Falange (including Hedilla) and many Carlists did not join the unified party. Franco had sought to control the Falange after a clash between Hedilla and his main critics within the group, the legitimistas of Agustín Aznar and Sancho Dávila y Fernández de Celis, that threatened to derail the Nationalist war effort. [ 13 ]

None of the vanquished parties in the war suffered such a toll of deaths among their leaders as did the Falange. Sixty per cent of the pre-war Falange membership lost their lives in the war. [ 14 ]

However, most of the property of all other parties and trade unions were assigned to the party. In 1938, all trade unions were unified under Falangist command.


Falange Espanola - History

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Only a few people know that the first foreign delegation of the "Falange Espanola de las JONS" was ordered by José Antonio Primo de Rivera in Milan ( Italy ). If the date of his foundation, August 8th 1935, is known, little we known about its activities in these early moments. This is probably due to the fact that it officially began its operations only in January 1936. No other branch of the Falange Foreign Service was never opened after that of Milan even though some other uncontrolled groups worked in Cuba, Mexico and Argentina.

The history of the "Servicio Exterior de FET y de las JONS" (Falange Foreign Service) was built by Spanish historians with considerable difficulty due to the lack of official documents.
This letter, addressed to Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minster , by Arturo Cuarter o , the leader of the Falange in Italy, represents a rarity in terms of both historical and collectible.
Arturo Quartero vender sig til Ciano og tigger ham om at & quotkomme et skib til hjælp, våben og ammunition, så vi kan gå i land i Agesiras, Cadiz, Alicante eller Tanger og derefter skynde os hen, hvor vores brødre desperat kæmper mod marxisme og kommunisme & quot.
Brevet blev sendt til Ciano af Arturo Cuartero den 26. juli 1936 samtidig med en anden adresseret til Duce med den samme tenor. På det bad Arturo Cuartero til Mussolini om at hjælpe Spanien med at kæmpe mod, at republikanerne stillede et fly til rådighed for Sevilla. Duces svar, personligt skrevet med blyant på brevet, var & quotnot possible & quot. De to breve følger det foregående brev, der blev sendt tre dage før til den italienske regering. Brevet blev skrevet på brevhovedet i Milan Falange med adressen på Foro Bonaparte 71. I dag ved vi, at Arturo Cuartero derefter formåede at nå Spanien og deltage aktivt i borgerkrigen, hvilket efterlod ledelsen af ​​den spanske Falange i Italien & quotad interim & quot til Juan Ordinas.


Se videoen: MEJORES MOMENTOS FALANGE ESPAÑOLA ENTREVISTA


Kommentarer:

  1. Kadison

    Jeg undskylder, men efter min mening tager du fejl. Lad os diskutere.

  2. Lorin

    What useful question

  3. Brent

    Tillykke, denne strålende idé bare indgraveret

  4. Bredbeddle

    Tak, læs det i et åndedrag

  5. Abdul-Ghaffar

    Flere muligheder?

  6. Hadrian

    Nu er alt klart, mange tak for hjælpen i dette spørgsmål. Hvordan kan du takke dig?



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